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On March 1, 2016 the Supreme Court of Japan handed down a landmark 
decision related the liability of caregivers who are taking care of a person 
with dementia (Alzheimer).2)　 At first, the Court set forth the relevant stat-
utes (see footnote below).3)
495（　 ）129
The Law of Liability in Contemporary in Japan to 
Third-Parties for Damages Caused by People 
with Dementia: A Review of the Tokai JR 
Supreme Court Case of March 1, 2016
Wiliam B. Cleary1)
1)　Dr. Wiliam B. Cleary is a professor law at Hiroshima Shudo University, and is 
admited to practice law in New York, California, Guam, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia.
 2)　Supreme Court Judgment 2016-03-01, Minshu Vol. 70. 3
 3)　Civil Code
Article 709
A person who has intentionaly or negligently infringed any right of other, or legaly 
protected interest of others, shal be liable to compensate any damages resulting in 
consequence.
Article 713
A person who has inflicted damages on others while he/she lacks the capacity to 
appreciate his/her liability for his/her own act due mental disability shal not be 
liable to compensate for the same; provided, however, that this shal not apply if 
he/she has temporarily invited that condition, intentional of negligently.
Article 714
(1) In cases where a person without capacity to assume liability is not liable in accor-
dance with the provisions of the preceding two Articles, the person with the 
legal obligation to supervise the person without capacity to assume liability shal 
be liable to compensate for damages that the person without capacity to assume 
liability has inflicted on a third party; provided, however, that this shal not apply 
if the person who has the obligation to supervise did not fail to perform his/her 
obligation or if the damages could not have been avoided even if he/she had not 
failed to perform his/her obligation.
(2) A person who supervises a person without capacity to assume liability, on behalf →
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FACTS
　A train accident occurred on the evening of December 7, 2007, when a 91-
year old man wandered away from his home in Obu, Aichi Prefecture, while 
his wife (85) was dozing.　Through he didn’t have any money with him at 
the time he somehow managed to board a train at Obu Station and he got of 
at the next station, Kyowa Station.　At that station he walked onto the tracts 
and was subsequently hit and kiled by a train.
　Central Japan Railway Co. (JR Tokai) sued the family of the deceased in 
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of a person who has the obligation to supervise, shal also assume the liability 
under the preceding paragraph.
Article 752
A husband and wife shal live together and provided mutual cooperation and 
assistance.
Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentaly Disabled
Article 20
(1) For mentaly disabled persons, their guardians or curators, spouses, and per-
sons with parental authority and person under duty to support them become 
their custodians; provided, however, that those who fal under any of the folow-
ing items do not become custodians:
(i) a person whose whereabouts are unknown
(i) a person who has brought or is bringing an action against the mentaly dis-
abled person, or spouse or lineal blood relative of such person;
(ii) a statutory agent, curator, assistant who has been replaced by the family 
court;
(iv) a bankrupt person;
(v) an adult ward or person under curatorship; and
(vi) a minor
(2) If there are two or more custodians for a mentaly disabled person, they are to 
perform their duty in the folowing order; provided, however, that the family 
court may, at the request of an interested person, change the order among 
these persons except for the gurardian or curator, if it finds this to be particu-
larly necessary for the protection of the mentaly disabled person:
(i) a guardian or curator;
(i) a spouse;
(ii) a person with parental authority; and
(iv) a person appointed by the family court from among persons under a duty to 
support other than those referred to in the preceding two items.
→
the amount 7.2 milion yen for damages caused by the delay in train 
service.4)
BACKGROUND
The husband (deceased-hereinafter P) was born in 1916, and the wife 
(hereinafter Y1) in 1922.　They married in 1945 and lived together since 
then.　They have four children, among whom Defendant Y2, was the oldest 
son.　He had moved to Yokohama City in 1982 along with his wife 
(hereinafter Q).
　P had run a real estate agency service until around 1998.　P’s residence 
was located in Aichi Prefecture and consisted of a living area and office area 
and had both a home entrance and an office entrance.
　Around December 2000, P started to show strange signs and behavior.　
For example, he would say “When do we eat” after finishing his meal, was 
unable to distinguish whether it was day or night.　Seeing such conditions, 
the defendants thought that P had become demented.
　In 2002, P started displaying forgetful behavior, he had forgoten that he 
had taken a drink of alcohol, and would get up many times in the middle of 
the night to check to make sure the doors were locked.
　In March of 2002, the defendants and Q would meet at the residence and 
discuss how to take care of P in the future.　They recognized the fact that 
Y1 was already over 80 years old and had difficulty taking care of P al by 
herself.　They al agreed that Q would move from Yokohama to P’s prop-
erty in order to help Y1 care for P.　Q began to go to P’s residence every 
day and take care of P, and sometimes she would stay at his residence.　Y2, 
who lived in Yokohama and worked in Tokyo, would return to his father’s 
home twice a month to see how things were going.
　The family decided to apply for long-term care insurance and asked their 
treating doctor to write an opinion for such application.　P was given a cer-
tificate for Level 1 (there are five levels of need for long-term care, with 
Level 5 being the most severe level).　In November 2002, P’s level was 
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a family member commits suicide by jumping in front of a moving train.
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raised to Level 2.
　P was admited to a hospital in August 2002, and started to show symp-
toms that suggested his dementia was worsening.　In March 2003, the doc-
tors had determined that he had falen il with Alzheimer’s dementia.　As a 
resulted, he started to go to welfare facility once a week as an out-patient.　
However, at the time of his death he was going to the facility six times a 
week.　On the day he didn’t go there, Q would care for him at home from 
morning to night.
　He started to confuse his wife with his mother and was unable to identify 
his children.　P refused to stay at home in spite of Q’s request to the con-
trary, and she was forced to accompany him when he went out.
　In February 2004, his doctor diagnosed that P was sufering impairment in 
orientation and memory in terms of places and people and that his dementia 
was progressing from around a medium level to a severe level.
　In the early morning of August 3, 2005, P went out alone and went missing.　
Then around 5:00 a.m., he was found due to a report to the police from the 
manager of a convenience store nearby.
　By January 2006, Y1 had also obtained a certification for Level 1 for long-
term care based on an investigation that she suffered paralysis and contrac-
ture of both legs, and could only sit up or walk if she held on to something.
　At midnight on December 26, 2006, P went out alone and took a taxi.　
The driver noticed his dementia and let him out at a convenience store.　P 
was taken into custody by the police and was returned to his home around 
3:00 a.m.
　After the incidents mentioned above, Q informed the local police about 
the situation and gave them her contact information, etc.　And she sewed a 
piece of cloth on P’s outerwear with his name and Q’s cel phone number 
writen on it.　In addition, Y2 instaled a door chime on the home entrance 
so that the sensor could detect if P tried to get out.　A chime would ring at 
Y1’s bedside so she would know if P was trying to leave.
　The defendants and Q had once tried to lock the gate to prevent his depar-
ture but this proved to be dangerous because P would become irritated and 
shake the gate violently.　Also, at times P was unable to recognize where he 
was and urinated wherever he happened to be at the particular moment.
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By February 2007, P’s condition deteriorated to the point that he was a 
Level 4 regarding need for long-term care.　He frequently displayed symp-
toms and behavior during his daily activities.　He had dificulty in communi-
cating and could not understand where he was, and was in need of care al 
the time.
　The family met to discuss how to proceed regarding P’s care and consid-
ered puting him into an intensive care home for the elderly.　However, his 
daughter suggested that P’s condition would worsen due to his confusion at 
being at such a facility.
　He had sufficient capability to stay at home provided that he was watched 
over by his family.　Also, such care facilities were overcrowded and there 
was a long waiting list, and it would take a few years in order to be admited 
to one.　The family finaly decided that he would remain at home.
　P lost interest in money as his dementia progressed and at the time of the 
accident he had neither money nor a walet with him.　Daily shopping for 
P’s necessities was done by Y1 and Q, and his overal finances were taken 
care of by Y1.
　At the time of the accident, Q took care of P based on the folowing 
schedule.　Q would go to his house every morning around 7 a.m., wake 
him up, change his clothes, make his breakfast and then take him to the wel-
fare facility.　In the late afternoon she would take him back home and chat 
with him for about 20 minutes, and wait for him to doze off so she could do 
some housework in the kitchen.　After his nap, Q would take him for a walk 
once every three days.　After dinner he would take a bath and go to bed.　
Q would return back to her own home once she confirmed that he was 
asleep.
　Around 4:30 p.m. on December 7, 2007, the day of the accident, P 
returned home by a courtesy car of the welfare facility.　He went to the 
office area of the building and sat on chair and spent time with Y1 and Q.　
Before entering the house P urinated in a cardboard box near the entrance 
and Q went to clean it up.　P and Y1 remained in the office alone.　Y1 
dozed off and P went out of the office area by himself.　He went to the train 
station and boarded a train, geting off at the next station.　He went to end 
of the platform and opened the gate of the fence and stepped down from the 
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platform in order to urinate.　He was struck by a train around 5:47 p.m.
　At the time of the accident P lacked legal capacity due his severe demen-
tia and was not able to appreciate his liability to others.
HIGH COURT DECISION5)
　The trial court (court of first instance) had held that both Y1 and Y2 were 
liable to JR Tokai.　However, the high court upheld the decision as to Y1, 
but dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for damages against Y2.
　The high court held that where a person, due to a mental disorder as pre-
scribed in Article 5 of the Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentaly 
Disabled, the person’s spouse who is living with the person assumes the obli-
gation to supervise the person based on the duty of a married couple to live 
together and provide cooperation and assistance to each other, unless there 
are special circumstances which would make it impossible to legaly expect 
the married couple to fulfil their duty.6)
　In this respect, the high court relied on Article 714, paragraph (1) of the 
Civil Code and held that Y1 was a person with the obligation to supervise 
because she was the wife of P, and they lived together.7)
　Even though Y1 recognized that P had a desire to go out despite his 
impaired condition and severe level of dementia, she failed to turn on the 
chime with a sensor instaled in the office entrance which could have easily 
done.
　In light of these facts and other factors, it can be said that Y1 did fail to 
perform her obligation to supervise.　Moreover, it could not be said that the 
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 5)　Nagoya High Court Decision April 24, 2014.
 6)　Article 752 of the Civil Code
 7)　Article 714
(3) In cases where a person without capacity to assume liablility is not liable in 
accordance with the provisions of the preceding two Articles, the person with 
the legal obligation to supervise the person without capacity to assume liability 
shal be liable to compensate for damages that the person without capacity to 
assume liability has inflicted on a third party; provided, however, that this shal 
not apply if the person who has the obligation to supervise did not fail to per-
form his/her obligation or if the damages could not have been avoided even if 
he/she had not failed to perform his/her obligation.
damage would have occurred even if she had not failed said obligation.
　As to Y2, the oldest son, the high court held that even though he provided 
financial support to P, he did not live with him, and did not assume the obli-
gation to supervise his father.　Y2 had lived in Yokohama for twenty years, 
and had not been appointed as P’s guardian.　In light of these facts, Y2 can-
not be deemed to have assumed a legal obligation to consider every aspect 
of P’s daily life and to care for his personal maters.
SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court determined that the high court had erred in holding
Y1 liable for damages to the plaintiff.
　Pursuant to Article 714(1) of the Civil Code “the person with the obliga-
tion to supervise” is liable for damages caused by the person they are to 
supervise.　So the question in this case is whether Y1 and Y2 are persons 
with the meaning of the statute.
　The law at the time in 2007 provided that guardians and custodians were 
not persons within the meaning of the statute simply based on their status as 
a guardian or a custodian.8)　 A guardian of an adult, in undertaking affairs 
related to the adult, must consider the adult’s mental and physical condition 
and living circumstances.　In light of the guardian’s authority, etc., the 
guardian’s obligation to perform juridical acts such as concluding contracts 
on behalf of the adult.　However, it could not be understood as requiring 
the guardian to actualy supervise the adult’s behavior.
　As to the duty of amarried couple to cooperate and assist each other pur-
suant to Article 752, this does not place either of them under an obligation to 
do something in relation to a third party.　Actualy the court held that this 
duty was abstract in nature and that it was impossible to force either a hus-
band or wife to fulfil the duty to live together.　The duty to provide assis-
tance to each other is interpreted as a duty to assure the livelihood of the 
other party, but does not lead to the obligation to supervise the other party 
in relation to a third party.
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　Consequently, the Court held that a mentaly disabled person’s spouse 
who lives together with that person cannot be deemed to a “person with the 
legal obligation to supervise the person without legal capacity as referred to 
in Article 714 paragraph (1) of the Civil Code only because of such status.
　Defendant Y1 was P’s wife (and was P’s custodian at the time of the 
accident.9))　However, the Court held that she could not be deemed to “a 
person with legal obligation to supervise.”　As to the first son, Defendant 
Y2, the Court held that there were no legal grounds for considering that he 
was deemed to a be a “person with the legal obligation to supervise.”
　However when special circumstances exist, such a person should held to 
have assumed the obligation to supervise in light of the personal relation-
ship and the status of daily contact between them.
　Whether or not a person is regarded as such a person who is equivalent to 
a person with such an obligation, the Court held that an objective standard 
and equity should be applied.
　In this case, P started to show symptoms of dementia around 2000, and 
was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s dementia by 2002.　He started to show 
symptoms such as impairment in orientation and memory around 2004.　He 
was a Level 4 regarding need for long-term care in February 2007.　Leading 
up to the accident he had gone missing on two occasions, once in 2005, and 
another in 2006.　Y1 was herself at Level 1, 85 years of age, and suffering 
paralysis and contracture of both lower limbs.　She needed Q’s help in tak-
ing care of P.
　The Court held that in view of these matters that she should not be 
deemed to have been practicaly capable of supervising P to prevent him 
from harming a third party, nor could it be found that she assumed the obli-
gation to supervise.
　As to the first son, Y2, the Court also held that he could not be deemed to 
be a person with the obligation to supervise.　He had lived in Yokohama for 
more than twenty years.
　In conclusion, the Court determined that the High Court had erred by 
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 9)　See Article 20 of the Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentaly Dis-
abled prior to the amendment by Act 47 of 2013.
holding Y1 liable for damages under Article 714 of the Civil Code, and dis-
missed the Plaintiff’s claim for damages.　And held that the High Court was 
correct in dismissing the claim against Y2.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE MICHIYOSHI KIKUCHI
Justice Kikuchi agreed with the majority opinion and add further explana-
tion as to the law in Japan regarding guardians, and custodians, and those 
person with the duty to supervise pursuant to Article 714 of the Civil Code.　
He set forth the history of the legislation in this mater and indicated what 
the law was before the 1999 amendment, and after it.
　Prior to the 1999 amendment the Act on Mental Health and Welfare for 
the Mentaly Disabled (hereinafter (Mental Health and Welfare Act) and the 
Civil Code respectively provided for a custodian and guardian as folows:
　If a mentaly disabled person who is adjudicated incompetent has spouse, 
the spouse automaticaly became the guardian of that person.10)　 A guard-
ian had the obligation to give medical and nursing care to an incompetent 
person.11)　 And, this guardian had the authority to commit the incompetent 
to a mental hospital with the permission of the court.12)　 A guardian held 
the first rank in the order of the persons who would automaticaly become 
a custodian to supervise a mentaly disable person to prevent him/her from 
injuring him/herself and harming others.13)
Justice Kikuchi explained that the conventional interpretation of these 
laws was that as long as the mentaly disabled person had a spouse, the 
spouse shal automaticaly became the person’s custodian and guardian, and 
would have the obligation to supervise within the provisions of Article 714.
　This was the law from the enactment of the Mental Health Act in 1950, 
and remained so until the 1999 amendment.　After the amendment, Article 
858 paragraph (1) which had read that a guardian “must make eforts to give 
medical and nursing care,” was revised to stipulate that “a guardian of an 
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11)　Article 858, paragraph (1) of said Code
12)　Id. Paragraph (2),
13)　Article 20, paragraph (2), and Article 22, paragraph (1) of the Mental Health and 
Welfare Act.
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adult, in undertaking affairs…, must consider the adult’s mental and physi-
cal condition and living circumstances.”　Thus, as explained in the majority 
opinion, a guardian of an adult is not required to supervise the adult’s 
behavior.
　As a result, the act of watching a mentaly disabled persons daily activities 
and supervising the person to prevent him/her from harming others is not 
a function to be performed by the guardian, and therefore, a guardian cannot 
be deemed to have been designated by law as a person with the legal obliga-
tion to supervise as prescribed in Article 714 of the Civil Code only because 
of such status.
　As a result of the 1999 amendment, an adult’s spouse or other relative 
would no longer be appointed as a guardian only because of their legal 
status.　In other words, the kinship-based system was abolished.
　Now, even when an adult’s spouse, parent, or child is appointed as his/her 
guardian, it is not because of the familial connection, but because of the per-
son’s suitability to serve as a guardian pursuant to the requirements pre-
scribed in Article 843, paragraph (4) of the Civil Code.　There is no reason 
for an adult’s relative to come first as the candidate for the appointment of 
the guardian of the adult.
　With regard to a custodian, the 1999 amendment introduced a provision 
that reads, “a custodian must enable a mentaly disabled person…to receive 
medical treatment and protect the mentaly disabled person’s economic 
benefits,” and deleted the provision pertaining to the obligation to supervise 
a mentaly disabled person to prevent him/her from injuring him/herself or 
harming others.
　The obligation to assist a person to get medical treatment means nothing 
more than having the person get to the hospital, and the obligation to pro-
tect economic benefits means nothing more than providing practical protec-
tion by keeping an eye on the person’s personal property.
　In this case Y1 was P’s custodian, but she did not have the obligation to 
assist him to get medical care because he was already under the care of 
doctors.　Finaly, it was held that a custodian cannot be deemed to fal 
within the category of person with the obligation to supervise only because 
of such status.
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In other words, the guardian’s obligation to give medical and nursing 
care, and the custodian’s obligation to supervise, which provided the basis of 
the guardian’s status as a person with the obligation to supervise as desig-
nated by law, no longer existed as a result of the 1999 amendment.
　Justice Kikuchi went on to explain about the legal incapacity system.　He 
said that it is a system to protect persons who lack the ability to make value 
judgments in legal terms.　If the system held the supervisor responsible for 
what the person did, the supervisor would be motivate to restrict the activi-
ties of the person, to their detriment.
　The custodian’s and guardian’s obligation to supervise has been abolished 
because these obligations impose too heavy a burden on them.　They 
would have to accompany the person at al times and the burden would be 
too heavy.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE KIYOKO OKABE
Justice Okabe agreed with result of the majority, but took issue with the 
status of Y2, the first son.　She held that he did in fact come with the cate-
gory of persons with the obligation to supervise, but that he had not failed in 
that obligation.　He had lived with P until 1982 when he was transferred to 
Tokyo for his job.　He had built his residence on the property of P, and 
when P became il, he sent his wife, Q, to go and take care of P.　She lived 
in the house next door and would go to P’s house every day to care for P, 
and would sometimes even stay overnight there.
　Y2 went to visit his father three times a month and would get frequent 
information concerning his father’s condition from his wife.　The overal 
administration of P’s property, including the management and renewal of 
lease contracts was conducted exclusively by Y1.　Y2 had been involved in 
decisions regarding P’s situation though out the entire process.　Using the 
reasonable person standard, an objective standard, she held that Y2 was not 
liable because he had done everything any reasonable would have done.　
Justice Takehiko Otani also wrote a concurring opinion and agreed with 
Justice Okabe.　They both felt that Y2 was a person with the obligation to 
supervise, and that he had not failed in that obligation.　Therefore, he was 
not liable to the plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
　Dementia is an ilness that affects milions of people world-wide.　The 
care for family members with this is ilness is a struggle for al concerned.　
How the courts deal with the issue of liability to third-parties for damages 
cause by such patients is a current topic of discussion.
　In Japan, the courts and the legislators have begun to see the issue in con-
temporary ways, and have abandoned the old notion that family members be 
held liable under any circumstance.　Such a burden would restrict the activi-
ties of such patients to their detriment.
　This decision wil impact families across the country and wil come as a 
sense of relief.　Caring for a loved one is difficult in and of itself, and the 
additional risk of financial ruin would be too heavy of a burden to impose on 
family members.
　The compassion shown by the Supreme Court in this case is a wonderful 
development in elder law and I am sure there wil be many academic articles 
writen on the subject in the future.
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